A superpower’s uneasy mirror by Thanos Kalamidas

There is a pattern in Donald Trump’s posture toward Europe that is too consistent to dismiss as improvisation. The troop reductions in Germany, the tariff threats against European industries, the rhetorical jabs at Spain and Italy, even the theatrical suggestion of siding with Argentina over the Falklands. These are not isolated provocations. They form a worldview. And at its core lies something less strategic than it is psychological, a deep discomfort with a Europe that acts as one.

Trump’s politics have always thrived on asymmetry. He prefers bilateral relationships where leverage can be applied directly, where pressure can be personalized, where outcomes can be framed as wins or losses. A fragmented Europe fits neatly into that approach. A united Europe does not. The European Union, for all its bureaucratic inertia and internal disagreements, represents something Trump instinctively resists, a rules-based bloc that negotiates collectively, sets standards, and dilutes the kind of transactional bargaining he favors.

This is why the economic argument, often cited by Trump himself, feels incomplete. Yes, trade imbalances matter. Yes, American administrations across party lines have long criticized aspects of European trade policy. But Trump’s rhetoric goes further. It is not merely about correcting terms; it is about undermining the structure that allows Europe to negotiate as a peer. Tariffs, in this context, are less about steel or cars and more about signalling that the United States will not passively accept a competitor that can match its regulatory and economic weight.

There is also a strategic layer that is harder to ignore. A more cohesive Europe, especially one that deepens its defence coordination, inevitably raises questions about NATO’s future balance. For decades, American power has been amplified by alliances in which Washington sets the tone. A Europe that invests seriously in its own security architecture and speaks with one voice, introduces a subtle shift. It becomes less dependent, less predictable and from a certain perspective, less controllable.

Trump’s instinct, then, is not necessarily fear in the traditional sense. It is resistance to a redistribution of influence. His foreign policy has consistently favoured a hierarchy with the United States at the unquestioned top. A united Europe complicates that hierarchy. It does not replace American leadership, but it demands negotiation rather than deference. For a leader who measures success in dominance rather than balance, that distinction matters.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to romanticize Europe’s position in this dynamic. The European Union has often struggled to articulate its own strategic identity. Internal divisions, over fiscal policy, migration, defence spending, have made it an easy target for external pressure. Trump’s approach exploits those fractures. His criticisms resonate in part because they touch on real inconsistencies within the European project. The challenge for Europe is not merely to respond to American pressure but to resolve its own ambiguities.

What makes this moment particularly striking is how openly the tension is expressed. Previous administrations might have pursued similar objectives, pressuring allies on spending, pushing for better trade terms but they did so within a framework that emphasized partnership. Trump strips away that language. He frames allies as competitors, agreements as zero-sum, and diplomacy as a series of transactions. In doing so, he reveals a belief that alliances are valuable only insofar as they reinforce American primacy.

So the question is not whether the United States needs Europe. It clearly does, economically and strategically. Nor is it whether Europe depends on the United States. That interdependence remains undeniable. The real question is whether the relationship can evolve beyond a model rooted in post-war assumptions. Trump’s answer appears to be no. He does not seek adaptation; he seeks recalibration in America’s favour.

If there is unease in Washington about a united Europe, it is not because such a Europe would destroy the American economy. It is because it would force the United States to share the stage in ways that feel unfamiliar. And for a political philosophy built on winning, sharing has always looked suspiciously like losing.

Uninvited guests by Mia Rodríguez

Two US citizens, reportedly tied to the CIA, die in a car crash in northern Mexico and suddenly the silence that usually cloaks intelligence work gives way to something louder; anger, suspicion and a familiar sense of intrusion. The operation they were linked to, an anti-drug raid in Chihuahua, was apparently unknown to Mexico’s own federal government. That detail alone tells you almost everything about why this incident has struck a nerve.

Sovereignty, after all, is not an abstract principle. It is the basic expectation that what happens within a nation’s borders is not orchestrated by outsiders acting unilaterally, however noble their stated aims. When that expectation is violated, even in the name of fighting drug cartels, the message received is not one of partnership but of disregard. Mexico’s reaction, particularly from its president, has been predictably sharp, but also justified. This is not simply about two lives lost in a tragic accident. It is about a pattern.

The CIA carries with it a long, complicated reputation in Latin America, one that is not easily softened by time or rhetoric. From Cold War interventions to more recent allegations of covert influence, the agency has often operated in ways that blur the line between cooperation and manipulation. In that historical context, even a narrowly focused anti-drug mission begins to look less like assistance and more like a familiar script being replayed. The suspicion is not that every operation is malicious, but that the logic behind them rarely prioritizes local autonomy.

What makes this case particularly combustible is the lack of transparency, not only after the fact, but beforehand. If Mexico’s federal authorities were indeed unaware of the raid, then the issue is not miscommunication; it is exclusion. That exclusion undermines trust, and without trust, cross-border cooperation becomes performative at best. It also raises uncomfortable questions about accountability. Who authorized the operation? Under what legal framework? And perhaps most importantly, who gets to decide what risks are acceptable when those risks unfold on someone else’s soil?

There is a tendency in Washington to view the fight against narcotics as a shared battle that justifies extraordinary measures. But shared battles require shared decision-making. Otherwise, they are simply unilateral campaigns dressed up as collaboration. Mexico has its own institutions, its own strategies, and its own political realities. Ignoring those in favor of covert action does not strengthen the fight against drug trafficking; it complicates it, introducing diplomatic friction where coordination is most needed.

At the same time, it would be too simple to reduce the situation to a morality play of foreign overreach versus national dignity. Drug cartels operate across borders with a fluidity that governments struggle to match. They exploit legal gaps, corrupt officials, and move with a speed that bureaucracies cannot easily replicate. This creates a constant pressure for more aggressive, more unconventional responses. Intelligence agencies thrive in that space. But thriving there does not absolve them of the consequences when their actions collide with political realities.

The crash in Chihuahua has, in a grim way, forced a conversation that might otherwise have remained buried. It has exposed the fragile architecture of U.S.-Mexico cooperation, where public agreements coexist uneasily with private operations. It has also reminded both countries that even the most secretive missions can have very public repercussions.

In the end, the question is not whether intelligence agencies should be involved in combating transnational crime. They already are, and likely always will be. The question is whether they can do so without eroding the very partnerships that make such efforts sustainable. If the answer continues to be murky, then incidents like this will not be anomalies. They will be symptoms.

The breakaway barrel by Zakir Hall

A major Gulf producer stepping away just as global oil markets are rattled by conflict in Iran and threats to the Strait of Hormuz feels, to many observers, less like coincidence and more like strategic choreography. But that interpretation may be too clean for a world where energy politics is rarely that neat.

In reality, the UAE’s exit is less about a sudden reaction to war and more about a long-building fracture within OPEC itself. For years Abu Dhabi has signalled frustration with production quotas that it sees as increasingly misaligned with its expanding capacity and investment ambitions. The UAE is no longer simply an oil-dependent state seeking price stability; it is a capital-rich, globally integrated economy that views oil as one lever among many. Leaving OPEC is therefore not an emotional break, but a structural one.

Still, timing matters in geopolitics even when it is not the primary driver. The current turbulence in global energy markets, driven by disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and heightened regional conflict, has created exactly the kind of volatility where independent producers gain leverage. By stepping outside the cartel, the UAE frees itself from collective output discipline at a moment when flexibility is most valuable. That does not automatically mean it will flood the market or crash prices but it does mean it can respond faster than OPEC-bound competitors.

The irony is that this move may weaken the very stability OPEC was designed to protect. For decades, the organization functioned as a pressure valve, smoothing supply decisions among members who often had competing national interests. The UAE’s exit exposes how fragile that consensus has become. If one of the largest and most technologically advanced Gulf producers no longer sees value in coordinated restraint, others may begin to question it as well.

Yet it would be simplistic to frame this as OPEC’s collapse or the UAE’s opportunistic “walkout” in response to war-driven price spikes. Oil markets are not chessboards where a single move dictates outcome. They are layered systems shaped by investment cycles, shipping routes, financial speculation, and geopolitical fear premiums. The Strait of Hormuz crisis may amplify prices today, but structural shifts like this redefine how those shocks are absorbed tomorrow.

There is also a subtler strategic calculation at play. Independence from OPEC allows the UAE to pursue long-term production goals without negotiating internal compromises. In a world where energy demand remains uneven but persistent, being unconstrained may be more valuable than being coordinated. The country is effectively betting that agility will outperform cartel discipline over time.

So the “strange timing” is not necessarily evidence of orchestration. It is evidence of convergence, where long-developing internal tensions meet external crisis and appear suddenly synchronized.

What looks like a dramatic exit in the middle of a storm may, in fact, be a state choosing to sail on its own course precisely because storms are now expected, not exceptional.

Berserk Alert! #103 #Cartoon by Tony Zuvela

 

Tony Zuvela and his view of the world around us in a constant berserk alert!
For more Berserk Alert! HERE!
For more Ovi Cartoons, HERE!

---

Sigmund Freud: A Sense of Mission in Troubled Times by Rene Wadlow

It is then, a commonplace that the psychoanalyst must be aware of the historical determinants of what made him what he is before he can hope to perfect that human gift: the ability to understand that which is different from him.”
                                                  Erik Erikson (1902-1994)

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) whose birth anniversary we note on 6 May, had a sense of mission in an increasingly troubled time.  He needs to be seen as challenged by the issues of his time and yet also dealing with aspects of the human condition that are “timeless” − thus his use of Greek myths to illustrate continuing relations among people.  Freud's sense of mission also was reflected in his desire to have close “co-workers” and so the development of a close circle.  The influence of Freud is seen in the lives and activities of those of his circle. Some, like Carl Gustav Jung and Wilhelm Reich, went on to other approaches.  Some such as his daughter Anna developed specific applications of Freudian thought, in her case, childhood development. Erik Erikson, one of the few non-medical members of “the circle” developed a cycle of life approach that is an important contribution both to individual growth and to the making of social policy.

The cycle of life is the most universal structure for societies worldwide. All societies recognize that there is a progression from birth toward sexual maturity which results in some form of marriage union, moving on to old age and death.  At each of these stages, there is a form of public recognition that the person has reached this stage.  There are often rituals which accompany the shift from one stage to the next.

These rituals have been stressed by one of the 'fathers' of European anthropology, Arnold Van Gennep (1873-1957) in his 1909 study Rites de passage. (1) There is a need for rituals  as the progress from one life stage to the next is always resisted.  While the next stage of life usually has higher prestige and power, there is also a sense of loss of the comfort ot the earlier stage − what has often been called a “mid-life crisis” as older men look longingly at younger women. The life-cycle approach also highlights the linked nature of economic and social issues such as those of women attempting to combine family and marriage, work and possible activities in the wider community.

In terms of social policy, awareness of the cycle of life encourages flexible but secure labor policies such as phased retirement, better integration of women into the workforce and men into the lives of families so as to promote gender equality, inter-generational care and opportunities for resourceful aging. (2)

Erik Erikson has been a leading writer on the psychological aspects of each stage of life, developing an eight-stage cycle of life approach. One of Erikson's most widely-read books is Gandhi's Truth. (3) Erikson had been invited to India to lecture on his cycle of life approach in the light of the classic Hindu model which does not make as many sub-divisions between childhood and marriage. The categories of adolescence are a modern and largely Western concept. Nevertheless, adolescence is one period on which Erikson has focused. (4) In the first part of Gandhi's Truth he sets out both the traditional Hindu and his own divisions. It is interesting to study the two life-cycle divisions and the appropriate values for each period of life.

Erikson was part of the circle around Sigmund Freud in Vienna after the First World War. Originally, he was part of the circle as a teacher of the children of psychoanalysists working with Freud and the children of clients who had come to Vienna from other countries to be treated by Freud and his collaborators. Erikson had been trained in the Montessori techniques of early childhood education.

Anna, the daughter of Freud, was particularly interested in the psychological development of children and came to admire Erikson's teaching methods. She suggested to Erikson that he become a psychoanalyst for children and that she would do his psychoanalysis, a necessary first step before being able to practice as a psychoanalyst.

By the mid-1930s, many in Freud's circle saw the dangers of the growing Nazi ideology and started leaving Austria and Germany. Although Erikson did not think of himself as Jewish and had no religious practice of any sort, his mother came from a well-known Danish Jewish family and his stepfather was a Jewish medical doctor. The Nazis had a wide definition of who was a Jew. Therefore Erikson and his Canadian wife left Europe for the United States.

Although he had no medical degree − in fact no university degree of any sort − being part of the Freud circle opened doors. He was invited to teach and do research at the Harvard Medical School. He later taught at Yale. (5).  At these universities and as he was increasingly invited to speak at conferences, Erikson met the leading figures in both psychoanalysis and in the study of human  development.

For Erikson, each stage of life presents certain challenges which must be faced.  Each distinct stage of the life cycle is characterized by the ambiguous transitional period in which an individual becomes a more integrated member of the community.  No society allows an individual to confront the tensions, fears and anxieties posed by this transition.  However, for Erikson, transition is not only a moment of anxiety and of 'identity crisis'  but there is always a potential for growth, for moving to a higher level of consciousness. If there is not this psychological-spiritual growth, the person may be deformed by what Erikson called “the curse of unlived potentialities.”

 ********************************************

Notes and further readings
1) Arnold Van Gennep. Rites de passage
2) See Theodore Litz. The Person, his development throughout the Life Cycle.
3) Erik Erikson. Gandhi's Truth
4) See Erik Erikson. Childhood and Society (1950) and Erik Erikson. Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968). See also for a related approach: Jules Masserman. Youth – a transcultural psychiatric approach.
5) For a good biography of Erikson written by a fellow put younger psychoanalyst, see Robert Coles. Erik Erikson (l970). See also Robert Wallerstein and Leo Goldberger (Eds) Ideas and Identities. The Life and Work of Erik Erikson

 ********************************************

Rene Wadlow, President, Association of World Citizens

Marx cousins #026 #cartoon by Thanos Kalamidas

 

Groucho Marx attempts to seduce Karl Marx’s beard,
only to be met with a scathing analysis of capitalism
disguised as a poorly-aimed spittoon.

For more Marx Cousins, HERE!
For more Ovi Cartoons, HERE!

---

The convenient fiction of “outside forces” by Eze Ogbu

Recent findings of a commission appointed by Tanzania’s president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, are a case in point. More than 500 people, it concludes, were killed in violence surrounding last October’s election. That number alone is staggering. Yet what is more striking than the figure is the explanation offered, “trained agitators,” aided by vague “outside forces,” are to blame.

This narrative is as familiar as it is convenient. It shifts responsibility away from the state and onto shadowy, undefined actors. It reassures supporters that the government remains fundamentally innocent, merely reacting to chaos instigated by others. And it attempts to close the door on further scrutiny by offering a seemingly definitive account. But such explanations rarely withstand serious examination.

Human-rights groups and opposition figures paint a starkly different picture. They argue that the real death toll is likely much higher and that the majority of victims were killed not by rogue agitators but by the very security forces tasked with maintaining order. If that assessment is even partially accurate, the implications are profound. It would mean that the state was not a bystander to violence but its principal agent.

The commission’s framing raises immediate questions. Who exactly were these “trained agitators”? Where were they trained? What evidence links them to “outside forces”? The absence of specificity is telling. Vague accusations are politically useful precisely because they are difficult to disprove. They create an atmosphere of suspicion without requiring substantiation. In doing so, they allow governments to claim both victimhood and authority at once.

But ambiguity cannot mask reality indefinitely. Tanzania, once regarded as a relatively stable and moderate political environment in East Africa, has in recent years shown troubling signs of democratic backsliding. Elections have grown more contested, opposition voices more constrained, and the space for dissent increasingly narrow. In such a climate, it strains credibility to suggest that large-scale violence erupted primarily due to external manipulation rather than internal repression.

There is also the matter of accountability. A commission appointed by the very leadership under scrutiny is unlikely to deliver conclusions that fundamentally challenge that leadership. This is not a reflection on the individuals involved so much as on the structural limitations of such inquiries. True accountability requires independence, not just in name but in practice. Without it, investigations risk becoming exercises in narrative management rather than truth-seeking.

President Hassan came to power with cautious optimism surrounding her leadership. She was seen by many as a potential reformer, someone who might steer Tanzania toward greater openness after years of increasing authoritarianism. That promise now hangs in the balance. Leadership is tested not in moments of calm, but in moments of crisis, particularly when the state itself stands accused.

Dismissing criticism as politically motivated or externally driven may offer short-term relief, but it comes at a long-term cost. Trust, once eroded, is difficult to rebuild. Citizens who believe their government is unwilling to acknowledge wrongdoing are less likely to accept its authority, even in legitimate matters. The result is a deeper fracture between state and society.

The international community, too, faces a familiar dilemma. Strategic partnerships and regional stability often temper the willingness to confront uncomfortable truths. Yet silence, or tepid responses, can be interpreted as tacit approval. If over 500 people have indeed been killed and if credible voices suggest the number is higher, the issue demands more than polite diplomacy.

Ultimately, the question is not only what happened during Tanzania’s election violence, but whether the truth will be allowed to surface. Blaming “outside forces” may serve as a temporary shield, but it does little to address the underlying issues. If anything, it risks compounding them.

History has shown that narratives built on deflection rarely endure. The demand for accountability has a way of resurfacing, often with greater intensity. For Tanzania, the path forward will depend on whether its leaders choose to confront that demand or continue to deflect it.

Ovi thematic eMagazine, issue 34 - Indigenous Sovereignty

Welcome to the 34th issue of the Ovi Thematic eMagazine, centered on an urgent and frequently overlooked global discourse: Indigenous Sovereignty and the concept of the Fourth World.

The Fourth World ideas coined in 1974 by George Manuel, a prominent Shuswap Nation leader and the first president of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the term "Fourth World" describes distinct nations and peoples who live within dominant nation-states but remain separate from them. Manuel described this reality as a "nation within a nation," where sovereignty has been denied by the state but has never been extinguished by its inhabitants. Fifty years after Manuel introduced this paradigm, the 34th issue of the Ovi eMagazine assesses how society struggles to reconcile these fundamental truths.

The editorial highlights that contemporary society frequently reduces Indigenous realities, histories, and epistemologies to fit comfortably within non-Indigenous narratives. While there are gestures toward reconciliation, these often stop short of implementing true structural change.

Institutions frequently promote policies like "co-management" and consultation as the ultimate goals of Indigenous-state relations. However, the magazine argues that co-management is neither the final destination nor the primary objective. Instead, the deeper struggle requires the global community to dismantle the assumption that the Western nation-state is the sole legitimate form of political authority and territorial governance.

To grasp the scale of the issue,here some compelling demographic and environmental statistics:

Global Population: There are approximately 476 million Indigenous people living across 90 countries, which makes up about 6.2 percent of the global population.

Land Use: Indigenous peoples hold, occupy, or use a full quarter (25 percent) of the world's surface area.

Environmental Stewardship: Indigenous communities safeguard an estimated 80 percent of the world's biodiversity.

These figures are not mere data points; they stand as a testament to deep, inherent sovereignty over lands and ecosystems. Yet, this is a sovereignty that nation-states have historically sought to exploit, fragment, or erase for resource extraction and economic gain.

As you turn these pages, we invite you to join us in this inquiry. Let’s question our actions as an evaluating civilization towards to our roots and finding the right questions is more than half the battle; it is the very beginning of building a world we can all, finally, call home.

Of course this is Ovi and that also means that opinion articles, poetry, fiction and art would be part of the eMagazine as they have always been since the very beginnings.

So, with no further due, welcome to the new Ovi Thematic Issue

Read the Ovi Thematic eMagazine online HERE!
View, read it online or download it in PDF/epub format HERE!
And enjoy viewing & reading it online or download in PDF format HERE!
All Ovi eMagazines and eBooks downloads are FREE!

Enjoy reading this Ovi eMagazine issue,
Thanos Kalamidas

A warning written in fear by Jemma Norman

Two men stabbed in broad daylight in Golders Green is not just another crime report to be filed and forgotten. It lands differently. It echoes. Because this is not just any neighborhood, it is one of the beating hearts of Jewish life in London. When violence happens there, it carries a message far beyond the immediate victims.

Yes, the attacker has been arrested. Yes, the legal system will take its course. But focusing solely on the individual risks missing the larger, more uncomfortable truth: this did not happen in isolation. It sits within a pattern that has been growing, darkening, and becoming harder to dismiss.

Anti-Semitic incidents in London are no longer rare enough to shock in the way they should. That, in itself, is alarming. When a society begins to absorb targeted hate as part of its background noise, something fundamental has already shifted.

There is a tendency, especially in cities as diverse and complex as London, to explain away such acts. People reach for language like “isolated,” “random,” or “mentally unstable.” Sometimes those explanations are even true. But they are also convenient. They allow us to avoid confronting the climate that makes such violence more likely.

Because hate does not emerge in a vacuum. It grows where it is tolerated, where it is excused, where it is reframed as something less dangerous than it really is. It spreads through whispers, online rhetoric, casual prejudice, and the slow normalization of hostility toward a group that is portrayed as “other.”

Golders Green should have felt safe. Not perfectly safe, no city offers that but safe in the way that communities built over generations tend to feel. When that sense of safety is punctured, it creates a ripple effect, people look over their shoulders more often, parents worry more deeply, and identity itself begins to feel like a risk factor.

The real danger here is not just the violence. It is the erosion of trust. Trust that you can walk down your own street without being targeted. Trust that your community is not being singled out. Trust that the wider society sees your safety as non-negotiable.

London prides itself on being a multicultural success story. And in many ways, it still is. But that story depends on something fragile, the belief that diversity is protected, not merely tolerated. When targeted violence increases, that belief starts to crack.

The response must go beyond policing, though that is essential. It requires moral clarity. A willingness to call anti-Semitism exactly what it is, without dilution or hesitation. It requires leaders, institutions, and ordinary citizens to reject the subtle forms of hatred that often precede the overt ones.

Because by the time a knife is drawn in the street, the problem has already been growing for a long time.

What happened in Golders Green is a warning. The question now is whether it will be treated as one or quietly absorbed into the city’s ever-expanding list of things we’ve learned to live with.

The Obi/Kwankwaso ticket is another civil war in the making by Tunde Akande

Though Obi may present the mien of a quiet and humble politician, when the push comes to shove nobody can predict what power can do to Obi.

The Obi/Kwankwaso ticket is the revelation of the 2027 election cycle, one that might not bode well for Nigeria. When Peter Obi ran in the 2023 election, he ran with Datti Baba Ahmed, who was almost unknown until Obi made him his running mate when no northerner would look his way. Although Datti Baba Ahmed had a short stint in the Senate, he is still a dark horse. Datti is also the founder of Baze University in Abuja.

The man Obi wanted to run with was Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, the swashbuckling politician from Kano State, one of the most politically astute states in the north. But Kwankwaso told Obi the blunt truth: the North would not vote for him. Reason: Obi is Igbo. The North did not, even though Obi employed electoral magicians who told him he had won the presidency in 2023. Datti was belligerent and confrontational, but he could not pull any weight in the North of 2023. Obi is the nonaggressive politican who wants to perform magic in Nigeria’s politics - a style some of his followers are denouncing. They want him to be tough, politics is not a field for the humble, those who were with him keep saying. Combative activist, Dele Farotimi who joined Obi, said he would not follow Obi in 2023. Meaning, if Obi shows more agression, he’ll still work for him in 2027.

Kwankwaso will now run with Obi in 2027, all things being equal. They have to win the ticket of their new chosen party, the African Democratic Congress (ADC), which is having leadership crisis and several court cases to contend with. Atiku Abubakar, the colossus in Nigerian politics who wants the presidency so badly but has been unable to get it after six attempts at it, is waiting like a rock of Gibraltar for Obi and Kwankwaso at the ADC. Atiku got to ADC before Obi and Kwankwaso and has captured all the structures of the party while Obi and Kwankwaso were negotiating their ego away.

Atiku is very rich and a free spender, Obi is also rich but does not give away his money anyhow. Some of his associates have accused him of being stingy. Kwankwaso is not that rich but he is a heavyweight in the politics of the north. Kwankwaso is limited to Kano, where his New Nigerian Peoples Party (NNPP) won overwhelmingly in 2023. But he faces a problem now, the Hausa youths in the North are angry, they lost their territory and kingdoms to the invading Fulanis who promised them Eldorado but rather gave them poverty and slavery. They will no longer vote for any party that will not choose a Hausa as its candidate. They want a separate identity and not a joint Hausa-Fulani identity which they alleged the Fulani had used only to their advantage. The Hausa hold the population ace and they want to employ it to win a good future for themselves. The youths supported by their intellectuals are becoming more determined in their crusade. If they succeed, they will limit Kwankwaso and his Kwankwasiya movement in Kano and other parts of the North.

Atiku Abubakar’s huge cash is a threat. The man knows how to deploy it for political victory. His possible running mate Seyi Makinde, governor of Oyo State, has reportedly promised Atiku a whooping 10 billion naira donation as contribution to their anticipated joint ticket. Well deployed in a nation whose politics is run by money, they are likely going to take the ticket in ADC. ADC is talking of a consensus candidate which is not likely to be acceptable to Atiku. He has never been known to lose in such games. If Atiku takes the ticket, Nigeria will be saved from a calamity which an Obi/Kwankwaso ticket might mean. What is this calamity?

Former president Olusegun Obasanjo who was responsible for making possible the Obi/ Kwankwaso coalition saw ahead a problem of ego between the two. It was ego that did not allow them to come together in 2023. And when the results of the presidential election of that year came out it was obvious that if Obi and Kwankwaso had not split the votes of the opposition, President Bola Tinubu might not have won. So Obasanjo called the two to his presidential library in Abeokuta, Ogun State, and ironed that out. Kwankwaso was too big, in his reckoning, to run behind Obi. Obasanjo got Kwankwaso to cut down on his ego and agree to be running mate to Obi. But at a cost. Obi will only run for a term of four years. For the calculation of the power-hungry North, who finds it difficult to yield power to the south even for a day, that arrangement will satisfy its quest for power. Even after their public presentation, Kwankwaso is still saying he’s bigger than Obi in politics.

But that is the undoing of the coalition, and may well be the undoing of the nation. Not even Obasanjo was able to keep to his promise of only one term when he won the presidency in 1999. Not only did he do the second term he also wanted a third term which was denied him by the watchfulness of the Senate. The Igbos whom Peter Obi represents in real terms and who constitute the bulk of his supporters have been out of power for so long in Nigeria that they will never agree to leave power after only one term. None of Obi’s promises to turn the nation around can be accomplished in one term of four years. Kwankwaso comes with the typical Fulani arrogance. He said the North would be able to use its numerical strength to remove Obi if he refused to leave after four years. But that is easier said than done. That is where the problem is, and that is where the traditional hostility between the Igbo and the Fulani may come to the surface again. Kwankwaso will be difficult to manage as number two to Igbo man Obi in a situation where the number two man is no more than a spare tyre. Though Obi may present the mien of a quiet and humble politician, when the push comes to shove nobody can predict what power can do to Obi. The possibility of the pair not being well managed and spinning into another civil war because of old hostilities and rivalries cannot be ruled out.

First Published in METRO

***********************

Tunde Akande is both a journalist and pastor. He earned a Master's degree in Mass Communication from the University of Lagos.

fARTissimo #026 #cartoon by Thanos Kalamidas

 

fARTissimo is what people do not see when they see a piece of expression
but what they project in what they think they see.

For more fARTissimo, HERE!
For more Ovi Cartoons, HERE!

---