
History has a particularly cruel sense of humour. Eight decades after Yalta, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin carved the emerging post-war order into strategic understandings, the world appears to be flirting with another grand bargain. This time, the cast is Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. The furniture might be different, the microphones more sophisticated, and the photographs considerably more theatrical, but the underlying temptation remains depressingly familiar: the belief that the planet belongs to those powerful enough to negotiate its ownership.
Call it diplomacy. Call it strategic realism. Call it whatever fashionable expression the foreign-policy establishment invents to disguise its embarrassment. When three powerful men begin discussing the political future of continents without the meaningful participation of the people who inhabit them, we are not witnessing the triumph of diplomacy. We are witnessing the rehabilitation of imperial arrogance.
The most dangerous element of this emerging geopolitical imagination is its casual treatment of sovereignty as a negotiable commodity. Ukraine becomes a territorial question. Taiwan becomes a strategic inconvenience. Europe becomes a security arrangement to be adjusted according to American preferences and Russian demands. The Global South becomes an enormous chessboard, populated by governments expected to understand their place in somebody else's strategic calculations.
Putin has already demonstrated what happens when a powerful state decides that its neighbour's sovereignty is an historical misunderstanding. His invasion of Ukraine was not merely an act of military aggression; it was an assault on the fundamental principle that nations possess the right to determine their own political destiny.
Yet the disturbing possibility of a great-power settlement is that the aggressor might eventually be rewarded with precisely the political concessions that aggression was intended to obtain.
What message would that send? That borders are permanent only until somebody sufficiently powerful decides otherwise. That international law is binding on the weak and negotiable for the strong. That military violence can eventually become an acceptable instrument of territorial bargaining, provided the perpetrator possesses nuclear weapons and sufficient diplomatic leverage. This is not peace. It is the internationalisation of extortion.
Europe should be particularly alarmed. Not because it possesses some immaculate record of geopolitical innocence, but because it has spent decades constructing an institutional identity around the rejection of precisely this kind of power politics.
The European Union was supposed to represent something more sophisticated than the nineteenth-century balance of power: cooperation, institutional restraint, economic interdependence and the gradual replacement of coercion with law. A three-man geopolitical boardroom would expose the fragility of that ambition.
If Washington negotiates European security with Moscow while treating European governments as spectators, the Atlantic alliance becomes something resembling a property-management arrangement. If Beijing and Washington discuss Taiwan's future without Taiwanese participation, democratic self-determination becomes a decorative principle. If Russia is allowed to dictate the security architecture of Eastern Europe, then the European project discovers that its carefully constructed political vocabulary has not abolished imperialism. It has merely made imperialism considerably more difficult to discuss politely.
Europe cannot simultaneously defend Ukrainian sovereignty and accept that Russian security preferences automatically determine Ukraine's permissible political choices. Nor can it proclaim strategic autonomy while waiting for invitations to meetings where its own security is negotiated.
For much of the Global South, this spectacle would not represent a new geopolitical crisis. It would represent an old humiliation wearing expensive new suits.
Colonial borders, imposed economic arrangements, proxy wars and externally engineered political settlements have repeatedly demonstrated what happens when powerful outsiders claim superior knowledge of other societies' futures.
The emerging multipolar world was supposed to correct that historical imbalance. Instead, multipolarity risks becoming nothing more than a multiplication of imperial centres.
Three competing superpowers do not automatically produce a more democratic international system. They can just as easily produce three competing spheres of domination, each demanding obedience from its neighbours and each invoking sovereignty whenever its own interests require protection.
The answer is not to reject diplomacy between powerful states. Great powers must communicate, negotiate and manage dangerous rivalries. Nuclear confrontation is not a particularly attractive alternative to difficult conversations.
But diplomacy without accountability, representation and international law becomes something else entirely.
The United Nations Charter was not written to provide decorative language for summit communiqués. Its principles concerning sovereign equality, territorial integrity and the prohibition of aggressive force are supposed to constrain power, not merely describe its preferences.
A genuine peace settlement must include those whose lives, territories and political freedoms are at stake. Ukraine cannot be negotiated into submission. Taiwan cannot be reduced to a bargaining chip. Europe cannot outsource its security. The Global South cannot be expected to applaud another redistribution of influence.
The world does not need three emperors, three competing maps or three gentlemen deciding how much sovereignty everybody else can afford.
It needs something infinitely more difficult: powerful states accepting that their power does not confer ownership of the planet. Yalta was supposed to be a historical warning. Apparently, for some politicians, it remains an attractive business model.









