Bulgaria’s government resignation and the illusion of stability by Sabine Fischer

Bulgaria’s government resigned on Thursday, an event that on the surface may seem like another routine political tremor in a nation long accustomed to instability. But this moment, occurring just as Bulgaria prepares to join the euro zone, reveals something deeper and more troubling, the exhaustion of political alternatives in a system that promises change but delivers only variations of the same status quo. What we are witnessing is not merely a reset of leadership but the collapse of a familiar narrative, one that has held Bulgarian politics together for far too long.

For months, the coalition in power had become increasingly unpopular, its internal fractures exposed by a series of crises, policy missteps, and a pervasive sense that it was no longer capable of governing effectively. Yet, this government’s resignation does not signify the birth of fresh political energy. It instead ushers in a period of political drift, one that will likely see more of the same, familiar faces, recycled promises, and a public more disillusioned than ever.

What is remarkable about this moment is not the resignation itself, such events are almost routine in parliamentary democracies but the context in which it occurs. Bulgaria stands on the brink of a historic economic transition: entering the euro zone. This move, long championed by political elites and business leaders alike, is meant to anchor the country more firmly within European institutions and markets, promising stability, investment, and a closer alignment with Western Europe.

Yet the irony is bitter. Bulgaria seeks economic steadiness and credibility through monetary union just as its own political framework falters. To many Bulgarians, this juxtaposition feels like a profound contradiction: the country is ready for the euro but not for the political maturity that such an economic step demands. It is as if the political class is asking citizens to trust in an uncertain future while offering only worn-out leadership in the present.

The root of this instability is not confined to personalities or policy failures; it is structural. Bulgaria’s political landscape has been dominated for years by a narrow set of parties and leaders, each promising reform while deeply entrenched in the very networks and compromises that fuel public discontent. Corruption scandals, opaque decision-making, and an inability to address pressing social issues have eroded trust. Yet, when governance collapses, there is no viable alternative waiting in the wings, no vibrant new movement with the organization or appeal to assume the mantle of leadership.

This is the real crisis: not simply that a government fell, but that nothing truly new is ready to replace it. In many other countries undergoing political stress, we see the rise of insurgent movements, fresh coalitions, or charismatic figures willing to challenge the old order. In Bulgaria, the alternatives seem variations on familiar themes, parties splintered from older ones, alliances built on convenience rather than conviction, and civic movements that lack the resources or reach to translate popular frustration into political power.

The consequence of this hollowed-out political field is a prolonged period of uncertainty. Bulgarians will likely confront early elections, protracted negotiations, and perhaps another unstable coalition. In the interim, the day-to-day business of governance, from public services and economic policy to foreign relations, may suffer from a lack of coherent direction. This vacuum is not just a matter of inconvenience; it undermines public faith in democratic processes and strengthens the cynical view that politics is an elite game, remote from the realities of ordinary citizens.

It is important to recognize that political instability is not inherently destructive. Democracies can survive and even thrive amid turnover and debate. The problem arises when instability becomes endemic, when governing institutions lose credibility, and when the cycle of resignation and reformation becomes a habitual backdrop to national life. In such an environment, meaningful reform becomes almost impossible. Leaders look less toward long-term solutions and more toward short-term survival.

For Bulgaria, the looming euro adoption only magnifies these stakes. Joining the euro is not merely a technical economic adjustment; it is a symbolic leap, signaling a deeper integration into the European mainstream. But such a step requires a stable political foundation, transparent institutions, and a government capable of articulating and implementing policies that benefit the broad public. Without this, the shift to the euro risks being seen not as a collective achievement but as an abstract goal pursued by a disconnected elite.

There is a deeper irony here: the very forces that have pushed for euro membership, pro-European politicians and stakeholders, are partly responsible for the system that has left the Bulgarian public disenchanted. Advocacy for euro adoption has often been framed as a panacea, a sign of progress and normalization. But progress cannot be measured in currency denominations alone. The health of a democracy is equally defined by how its leaders are chosen, held accountable, and renewed.

As Bulgaria navigates this moment, its political actors must confront an uncomfortable truth: stability cannot be bought through external validation alone. It must be cultivated through genuine responsiveness to citizens’ needs, through openness to new voices and ideas, and through an honest reckoning with the structural flaws that have brought the system to its current impasse.

The resignation of the government could be a catalyst for renewal, a cleansing moment that forces the political class to rethink its assumptions. But more likely, unless there is a surge of new political energy, it will be remembered as another iteration of the same instability that has long plagued Bulgarian politics.

Bulgaria stands at a crossroad, one that juxtaposes economic opportunity with political fragility. How it navigates this juncture will define not only its place in the euro zone but the character of its democracy for years to come. The question now is not just who governs next, but whether the next chapter will offer something genuinely new or simply more of what has come before.


Subtropics #Poem by Abigail George

 

Love is quiet
Quiet

Be strong heart
I’ve cried tears

that have
tasted like the rain

Woven into my tissues
are wildflowers

What are woven
into yours?

I spoke to
the person in the cell

I went to bed with storms in my head
I called it a mistake then

And much later, a lesson

a choice

It’s summer
I feel the heat

beneath my skin
under my eyelids

I feed my father's cancer
tomato sandwiches

Dark
Dark
Dark

Here they come
The waves

Fear in my heart
for every word not said
every meal not prepared
when I saw blood

on the bandage
that covered your eye

Oh, mother
will you ever forgive me

for not listening to you?
Daily I write you poems

inside my head
that turn into

hymns, psalms
the Chopin melody turns into a river

the piano into a cold leaf

Dark
Dark
Dark

Here the waves come
I am left waiting for a miracle

in the dark
a spinster

with spinster thoughts
with spinster wants, needs and desires

even these fantasies
have tested me.

The nod-off president by Edoardo Moretti

There is a peculiar irony unfolding in American politics, one so on-the-nose that if it appeared in a satire show, it would be dismissed as too heavy-handed. Donald Trump, the man who spent years branding Joe Biden as “Sleepy Joe,” who mocked his opponent’s gait, sentences and supposed fragility, now presides over the Oval Office in his second term exhibiting the very behaviors he once ridiculed. And the country is watching, uncomfortably, as the joke circles back.

The recent string of televised moments, eyes drooping in meetings, incoherent tangents during speeches, sudden explosive outbursts on social media that read like the internal monologue of a man arguing with invisible adversaries, has ignited a national debate. Not about policy. Not about direction. About capability. About stability. And, increasingly, about the president’s health.

To be clear: aging is not a moral failing. Fatigue happens. Mental lapses happen. Humans are human. But when that human sits behind the Resolute Desk, entrusted with decisions that can alter economies, reshape alliances, and send soldiers into danger, the bar is different. It must be.

What America is witnessing feels less like ordinary exhaustion and more like a slow unraveling, uneven, erratic, impossible to predict and impossible to ignore. Watching a president nod off during a live-streamed economic briefing is no minor gaffe. Watching him launch into rambling digressions about nonexistent conspiracies in the middle of foreign policy remarks is not charming eccentricity. These are not normal blips in a stressful job. They look like symptoms.

And this time, the question is not simply “Is he tired?” It’s “Is he okay?” For years, Trump used insinuation as a political weapon, raising doubt about opponents not through evidence but through repetition, mockery, and innuendo. “Sleepy Joe,” he said, and half the country absorbed it as truth. “Not all there,” he smirked, and crowds cheered. He trained supporters to equate moments of slowness with cognitive collapse. He insisted that stamina was the ultimate proof of leadership.

But now the frame has turned. Clips of him slumped in his chair are replayed with the same intensity his campaign once applied to Biden’s debate stumbles. His recent unpredictability, tantrums mid-speech, contradictory statements, forgetting names, drifting off into unrelated anecdotes, has invited whispers even among allies who once defended him at every turn. Some dismiss it as stress. Others blame overwork. But more and more Americans are privately asking the same unsettling question: Is the president exhibiting signs of cognitive decline?

The tragedy is not simply that the country may be witnessing a leader falter. The tragedy is that Trump himself built the very measuring stick by which he is now being judged. When you loudly equate lucidity with legitimacy, you leave no room for compassion. You create a purity test no human can pass forever. And now the purity test is aimed at him.

The White House, of course, denies everything. Aides insist the president is “sharp,” that he merely “closes his eyes to listen,” that his lengthy digressions show his “unfiltered authenticity.” They chalk up his erratic messaging to “creative spontaneity.” But dismissals ring hollow when the evidence is visible on every screen. When the nation sees a president blink awake mid-sentence, the spin does not reassure, it patronizes.

The psychological tension extends beyond politics. A nation needs to believe its leader is grounded, focused, and capable. In moments of crisis, Americans want to feel that someone competent is steering the ship through turbulent waters. When the captain appears drowsy at the wheel, public confidence falters. And when confidence falters, everything else becomes shaky markets, diplomacy, even national morale.

Of course, it is possible that these moments are simply misread. It is possible the president is exhausted, not impaired. That stress, not decline, is the culprit. But the problem with opacity is that it invites suspicion. And the problem with Trump’s legacy of ridicule is that it leaves him little room to seek empathy now.

If he were any other leader, the conversation might be gentler. But when a politician spends a decade using mockery to delegitimize opponents on the basis of perceived age or frailty, he cannot be surprised when the boomerang returns.

The presidency is not a place for denial, certainly not for fragile ego. America deserves transparency. It deserves assurance that its leader is capable of fulfilling the duties of the highest office. And at the very least, it deserves to know whether the behaviors broadcast across national television are momentary blips or signs of something deeper.

This is not about politics. It is about stewardship. And right now, America is watching a president who once wielded insults as a shield now stand exposed by the very narratives he constructed. The question that lingers, heavy and unavoidable, is simple: Who is truly awake at the wheel?


Fika bonding! #113 #Cartoon by Thanos Kalamidas

 

Fika is a state of mind and an important part of Swedish culture. It means making time for friends and colleagues to share a cup of coffee and a little something to eat.

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Tides of legitimacy by Marja Heikkinen

There’s a strange geometry to global politics, a kind of moral cartography where distance isn’t measured in nautical miles, but in who gets to define the rules. Take, for example, the recent Yemeni seizures of commercial tankers in the Red Sea and the U.S. Navy’s interdiction of a Venezuelan-flagged vessel. On a map, these events sit on opposite ends of two different seas. But politically, the gap between them is far wider, stretching across oceans of power, narrative, and the privilege of who gets to be called a pirate and who gets to be called a defender of freedom.

Let’s be blunt: very few nations actually obey the same rulebook at sea. The rules shift depending on whose ship you’re boarding.

When Yemeni armed groups, specifically the Houthis, stop merchant vessels in the Red Sea, they’re immediately branded “pirates,” “outlaws,” and “global threats.” The word “pirate” comes with heavy political weight. It strips the actor of state legitimacy, places them outside the international order, and gives every powerful navy on Earth permission to intervene. Calling someone a pirate is a geopolitical eraser; it deletes their status, their grievances, and any claim that their actions are tied to ongoing conflict rather than random lawlessness.

Yet when the U.S. Navy stops a Venezuelan tanker, often with the justification of sanctions enforcement or counter-narcotics missions, the language transforms. Suddenly, it’s not piracy but “maritime security” or “upholding international law.” The U.S. frames itself as a custodian of stability, a sheriff patrolling a global ocean that it believes must remain open and orderly, under its definition of order.

This isn’t about moral equivalence; it’s about narrative power. If an armed group in Yemen claims they are acting in solidarity with Gaza or retaliating against attacks on their territory, the world shrugs. If the U.S. says it is protecting global commerce or enforcing sanctions against a government it deems hostile, those words carry institutional legitimacy, because the U.S. is a recognized state actor with a Navy that spans the globe and decades of diplomatic relationships to reinforce its narratives.

Put differently, legitimacy is not something you do at sea; it’s something you’re granted on land.

Of course, the Houthis are not internationally recognized rulers of Yemen and operate from territory seized in civil war. That matters legally. But it’s also true that international law is heavily shaped, some would say disproportionately by the very powers that have the luxury of large navies. When the U.S. conducts maritime interdictions thousands of miles from its shores, these actions are viewed through the lens of America’s role in global governance. When a non-state actor does something similar in a narrow chokepoint through which one-third of global trade flows, the instinctive reaction is to classify the act as criminal.

But legality does not exist in a vacuum. It lives inside politics. The U.S. Navy can stop a tanker and call it enforcement. Yemenis stop a tanker and it becomes piracy even when the motivations are political or military, not criminal. One is framed as upholding the order of the seas; the other as threatening the international system. But both are, at their core, acts of power, someone with weapons boarding someone else’s ship for strategic reasons.

If we’re honest, "pirate" is simply the label reserved for those who lack the status to enforce their will under the polite umbrella of international law.

There’s also a moral convenience at play. The Red Sea is a vital artery for world trade; any disruption sends insurers, governments, and shippers into a frenzy. When the Houthis target vessels linked to certain countries as leverage in a broader political struggle, it becomes intolerable not only because of legality but because of economic impact. The U.S., on the other hand, rarely faces consequences when it intercepts foreign vessels, partly because no one is powerful enough to stop it, and partly because the global system is built on an assumption that American power is, by default, stabilizing.

That assumption is rarely extended to armed groups in the Middle East. In the end, the distance between these two maritime incidents cannot be plotted by GPS. It is a measurement of narrative privilege: who has the authority to police the seas, who is permitted to use force, and who gets shoved into the category of “pirate” simply because no one wants to admit they’re acting politically.

So yes, Yemen and the U.S. are thousands of miles apart geographically. But the real gap is the one between who writes the rules and who gets written out of them. And that distance is far greater than any ocean.


Projecting self by Gabriele Schmitt

There’s a peculiar boomerang effect that happens whenever Donald Trump describes Europe. He leans into phrases like “weak,” “decaying,” or “past its prime,” as if he were diagnosing a continent in its final stages of political exhaustion. But listen closely, really closely and the tone starts to sound less like an analysis of Europe and more like an accidental confession.

Because when Trump paints Europe as frail, fearful, or fading, he’s really sketching a portrait of his own anxieties: a leader who once projected swagger now shadowboxing with relevance, desperately trying to reclaim a version of American dominance that no longer exists and arguably never existed in the cartoonish form he remembers.

Trump’s favorite rhetorical move is projection. It has always been his most reliable, if unintentionally revealing, form of communication. What he accuses others of, he often embodies. What he mocks is what he fears. And so when he calls Europe “weak,” it feels less like geopolitical critique and more like an aging strongman squinting at his reflection in the mirror, convinced he’s still towering while the world sees someone shrinking.

Europe, of course, is far from perfect no serious observer would pretend otherwise. It struggles with bureaucracy, political fragmentation, demographic challenges, and uneven military investments. Yet even with these headaches, Europe continues to be a global economic powerhouse, a leader in democratic governance, and a region where most citizens enjoy a standard of living Americans would envy. Europe’s problems are real, but they’re not fatal. Its institutions bend, adjust, argue, reform, and annoyingly slowly, move forward.

Trump’s own trajectory tells a different story. His political capital depends on division rather than unity, resentment rather than reform. His messaging increasingly relies on doom, decline, and grievance, an emotional palette far dimmer than the swaggering confidence he once strategically deployed. When he speaks of decay, he seems fixated on it. When he mocks others for being weak, he sounds obsessed with the concept of strength. And when he talks about crumbling institutions, he gravitates toward imagery that mirrors the chaos he has personally unleashed.

So what’s really going on? For one, Europe is a convenient foil. Trump needs adversaries who are big but not too big, symbolic enemies rather than genuine threats. Europe fits perfectly: impressive enough to attack for drama, safe enough to attack without risk, and familiar enough that American audiences recognize the names but not the nuances. By calling Europe “weak,” Trump reinforces his old storyline that only he can return America to greatness, only he can make allies bow, only he can reassert dominance.

But beneath the bravado lies insecurity. Trump’s worldview is fundamentally nostalgic. His foreign policy instinct is rooted not in strategy but in longing, for a romanticized past where America dominated through sheer weight. He often speaks as though the world stopped in 1985. In that sense, Europe’s modern complexity challenges him. It doesn’t behave like a caricature. It doesn’t tremble when he thunders. It negotiates, disagrees, pushes back, and worst of all, it sometimes moves on without him.

When Trump calls Europe “decaying,” what he’s really lamenting is the changing global order that no longer centers the world around American exceptionalism or Trump’s vision of it. Multipolarity frustrates him. Consensus politics confuses him. Cooperative power bores him. So he claims weakness where he sees difference. He declares decay where he sees independence. And yet, Europe persists.

It maintains one of the most stable political landscapes in the world. It has strong social protections, competitive economies, and cultural influence that far outstrips its size. If Europe is decaying, it is doing so at a suspiciously comfortable pace, one that still ranks it among the world’s most desirable places to live.

Trump’s projection reveals a personal truth more than a geopolitical one: the world is changing faster than he can reinterpret it. The contours of power look different now. Force alone no longer defines dominance. Alliances matter. Cooperation matters. Soft power matters. Stability matters. And none of those things are Trump’s strengths.

When he describes Europe as fragile, the irony is sharp. Europe is many things, messy, sometimes maddeningly slow, occasionally divided but fragile is not one of them. If anything, the political figure showing signs of fragility is Trump himself, leaning harder than ever on overstated insults to mask diminishing influence.

In the end, Trump’s comments about Europe aren’t really about Europe at all. They’re about an aging political brand struggling to stay relevant in a world that has already begun writing its next chapter.

And that, perhaps, is the clearest projection of all.


Talcott Parsons and the Promise of Transdiscipliarity by Rene Wadlow

Talcott Parsons (13 December 1902 - 8 May 1979)  was a leading US sociologist usually considered a member of the structural-functional analysis school.  Some of his major theoretical writings are The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949), The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), and Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Editors). Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954).  Parsons taught at Harvard University and was the doctoral thesis advisor of students who went on to became important figures in the same tradition such as Robert K. Merton Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), Marion J. Levy Jr The Structure of Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952) and Clifford Geertz The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). He also had students who went on to have radically different approaches and who became strong critics of Parsons’ approach such as C. Wright Mills in his The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).  Parsons’ approach was also attacked by George Gurvitch (1894-1965) a Russian-born French sociologist who spent the Second World War years in New York City and became knowledgeable with the schools of US sociology.

There are two aspects of Parsons’ work that merit attention.  The first is the role of Parsons in introducing and championing the work of the German sociologist Max Weber in the USA.  The second is the role of Parsons in helping create transdissciplinarity in area studies in the USA.

Parsons was unusual for his time in that he did all his graduate university studies in Europe. Many American students would spend a year at a European university but because of differences in degree programs would do their degree work within a US university.  However, Parsons did his MA at the London School of Economics and his doctorate at the University of Heidelberg. In London, he studied under R.H. Tawney who was interested in the link between Calvinist Protestant thought and the development of capitalism.  This was a topic of great interest to Parsons who came from a long line of Calvinist ministers who had gone from England to New England in search of religious liberty in the late 1600s.  Parsons’ father was a Protestant minister as well as president of a University, and Parsons kept a life-long interest in liberal Protestant theology.  In London, he also participated in a seminar led by the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski in which also participated as students E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes who went on to be the leading British anthropologists on African societies. Parsons always kept an interest in anthropology and some of his students went on to be professional anthropologists.

In Heidelberg, he studied under Alfred Weber (Max Weber’s brother) and got to know the widow of Max Weber who was a champion of Max Weber’s thought.  Parsons was taken by Max Weber’s thinking, especially the analysis of the link between religious thought and economic organization.  When Parsons returned to the USA, he started translating Weber and then getting his colleagues like Edward Shils and his students like C. Wright Mills to translate works of Weber.  Thus Max Weber went from being virtually unknown in the USA to being probably the most-often quoted sociologist in the USA.

After his doctorate, Parsons went to teach at Harvard, which is a leading New England University.  In 1931, sociology which had always been taught in the Department of Social Ethics became the basis for a new three-man Department of Sociology with the Russian-born Sociologist Pitrim Sorokin as chairman.  Sorokin and Parsons did not get along; both men had a high opinion of his own work, little tolerance for the work of others, and no sense of humor.  Parsons, who was always very good at university administration infighting was able to have created a new Department of Social Relations with himself as chair.  There he was able to develop a transdiciplinary approach by bringing in people from economics, anthropology, and psychology. By the late 1930s Parsons had become very interested in the work of S. Freud and was trained and underwent analysis at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute.

One of the important ideas that Parsons had drawn from Max Weber was the idea of the “ethic of responsibility”. What distinguishes responsibility from merely good intentions is the ability to foresee as far as possible the consequences of action and to make decisions based on this foresight. Thus, Parsons from his years of study in Germany continued to follow closely political evolution there.  He was a “premature” anti-Nazi and helped find jobs in US universities for German professors forced out of teaching by the Nazi government.  At Harvard, he set up a working group on the study of Germany in order to understand how the Nazis had come to power.  During the war, the group was transformed into a group to study what should be done after the war and to train people for the occupation of Germany which was to follow.

Likewise, as the US entered the war against Japan, Parsons organized working groups to study the societies of Japan and China.  While there had been people who specialized in the arts of the Far East in US universities, the study of the structure of their societies was largely unknown.  Harvard became a leading center for the study of Japan and China.  To his credit, Parsons continued his interest in Japan after the end of the war. One of the last things he did before his death was a lecture tour of Japanese universities.

With his responsibility for training people for the occupation of Germany, he had gone back several times to Germany to interview and to help set up sociological studies.  During these trips he had interviewed Soviet prisoners who had been members of the anti-Stalinist Vlasov movement — what some have called ‘Stalinists without Stalin’.  Parsons felt that relations with the Soviet Union would go from bad to worse and that Americans had little knowledge of Russian society.  Thus he pushed for the creation of a Soviet/Russian studies program at Harvard which became a leading center for Russian studies in the USA.

Parsons died in 1979 on a trip to Germany to celebrate the 50th anniversary of his Heidelberg degree.  While he had a difficult personality and relations with people who did not agree with him were often tense or broken off when Parsons realized that the other could not be converted, he did make important contributions to the study of society with his emphasis on a “theory of action”.  Most important, I believe, was his ability to create working groups focused on crucial world areas with a transdisciplinary approach which acknowledges that there is no hierarchy of research disciplines.  Rather transdisciplinarity transgresses these boundaries to provide original and creative outcomes.

 ****************************

Rene Wadlow, President, Association of World Citizens.  He was a student in the 1950s of Edward Shils, Marion J. Levy, and David Apter — all of whom had worked with Parsons.


Always something #117 #Cartoon by Thanos Kalamidas

Mix a little childhood silliness with adult seriousness
and you are always up to something;
trouble most of the time!

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Laurens van der Post: Memories, Dreams, Reflections by Rene Wadlow

Laurens van der Post (1906-1996) whose birth anniversary we mark on 13 December was an Afrikaner, South African writer but who wrote in English. Deeply influenced by his friendship with the Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung, van der Post could also call his collected writings after the title of Jung's autobiographic Memories, Dreams, Reflections.  The debt to Jung is developed in van der Post's Jung and the Story of Our Time.

Much of van der Post's writings have an autobiographic element  - his experiences as a prisoner of war in a Japanese camp in Java and his travels in the Kalahari Desert of South Africa with the Bushmen. But his memories are selective and often have a dream-like quality. He leaves out of his accounts the factual aspects of his strong attraction to women – often having several women in his life at the same time. Rather, real women become Jung's archetypal “feminine”. The psychological insights provided are Jungian in background, but they are by no means mere echoes.  Van der Post was an original thinker with a capital of ideas won from his experience and  the social structure of South African society.

As van der Post wrote in The Dark Eye in Africa “The white man has first discredited the African way of living and dealing with the forces of nature about and within, and then obliged him increasingly to live in a way which rejects the institutions, customs, initiation rites and rituals by which, for centuries, he has struck a balance with these overwhelming aspects of nature...What is deplorable is that having discredited this ancient way of living we have not put an honourable alternative in its place.”

For van der Post, understanding must include the capacity to feel with oppressed people the agony of their expropriated psychic lives and to comprehend their sense of having been dishonored . For van der Post, this sense began for him with the attitude of the dominant British South Africans toward the Afrikaners that they had defeated in the Boer wars and in the destruction of the Orange Free State where his grandparents had settled coming from the Netherlands.  Van der Post was attracted to English culture, wrote in English, and later spent much of his life in England, but he recalled sharply the  contempt  of the South African English for the Boers. He also knew the common attitude of both English and Afrikaners for the Blacks and Indians of South Africa.

He found the same attitude on the part of the Japanese military when, as a British officer, he was for three years in a Japanese prison camp in Java, then the Dutch East Indies.  “We had no rights, privileges, and no security.  Even the fact that we were alive was held to be a shameful argument against us, proof of our guilt and culpability as well as proof of the unprecedented magnanimity of our captors.  What we stood for was condemned in advance not because of anything we had done but because of what we were imagined to be.  None of us stood out as an individual and we were merely a collective reality for our rulers.”

Contempt can become internalized and become part of one's “self-image”.  To overcome this weakness, one needs a sense of “rebirth” - a “journey of becoming”.  Van der Post draws upon the stories and myths of the Bushmen of the Kalahari. He spent some time with them but also drew largely on the ethnographic work of others.  Van der Post is a master story-teller, and he is able to transform rather dry ethnographic studies into tales of renewal and rebirth – a writer well worth knowing.

 ****************************

Rene Wadlow, President, Association of World Citizens


When did the algorithm become the hiring manager? By Emma Schneider

There’s a strange new ritual taking shape in the corporate world, and most of us have already taken part in it whether we meant to or not. It goes something like this, a company receives your application, a machine scans your résumé, another machine evaluates your “digital footprint,” and an algorithm; cold, tireless, impressively unbothered by your liberal arts degree, decides whether you are worthy of human attention. Only after surviving this gauntlet of silicon gatekeepers do you earn the privilege of interacting with an actual person.

For years, job hunting resembled a two-way courtship. Applicants polished résumés. Employers reviewed them. Interviews, awkward, hopeful, palpably human, followed. Someone made a decision. It was imperfect but personal. Now, more and more companies are outsourcing their hiring to artificial intelligence, and it feels less like courting a potential employer and more like petitioning a distant oracle programmed by an intern.

We are told this is efficient, unbiased, future-proof. A neutral system scanning for skills, competencies, and patterns that humans might overlook. But increasingly, it feels eerily similar to asking social media platforms to vouch for our worthiness. Your online presence, your curated selfies, your memes, your half-forgotten posts from 2011, has become a de facto part of the application process. If your Instagram doesn’t disqualify you, maybe your LinkedIn endorsements will. “She has eight endorsements for leadership,” an algorithm might proudly note, while conveniently ignoring that they all came from former coworkers who just wanted to be polite.

The unsettling part is how quietly this shift occurred. Companies now rely on AI-powered applicant tracking systems to sift through candidates with the ruthless efficiency of a paper shredder. They scan résumés for keywords, eliminating anyone whose phrasing isn’t sufficiently optimized for machine digestion. They analyze video interviews for “microexpressions” and “vocal consistency,” as though the act of sweating through a Zoom call were some kind of psychological tell. One system even claims it can assess “cultural fit” using natural language processing, which is corporate-speak for “We want someone who speaks like us and therefore thinks like us.”

And these tools aren’t confined to low-stakes roles. Increasingly, they’re being used to filter candidates for jobs with real responsibility, leadership positions, financial oversight roles, jobs involving public trust. The irony should be enough to make your head spin: a machine is determining whether you’re responsible enough to be in charge.

Of course, AI is not inherently the villain. Used wisely, it can help reduce bias, improve efficiency, and broaden access. But too often, these hiring algorithms simply reinforce the biases of the data they are trained on. If a company historically favoured outgoing extroverts from elite universities, the AI may continue to do precisely that, except faster, at scale, and without stopping to question why all the boardrooms look eerily similar.

Even more troubling is the cultural implication: we are inching toward a world where people feel obliged to perform employability in public. Your posts must be professional but relatable. Your photos should radiate vitality but not frivolity. Your opinions must exist, but only in the safest, vaguest forms. The online self becomes another résumé one that follows you everywhere, glowing faintly behind your digital shoulder with every job you pursue.

This is not merely a matter of privacy. It’s a matter of identity. When companies rely on algorithms to hire, they aren’t simply choosing employees, they’re choosing data models that approximate people. And while the models may be consistent, they are terribly incomplete. AI can tell if you know SQL. It cannot tell if you’re thoughtful, principled, or quietly brilliant. It can detect your ability to speak confidently on camera, but it cannot detect your capacity to lead with empathy in a crisis. It can identify patterns in your work history, but it cannot grasp the context behind your choices, the sick parent you cared for, the industry that collapsed, the bold leap of leaving a stable job for one that mattered.

In the traditional job interview, flawed as it was, there remained the possibility of surprise. A candidate could charm, impress, or challenge expectations. Humanity itself could alter the outcome. Now, we are asked to present not our full selves, but our most machine-readable selves. And that should make us uneasy.

It’s not that AI should be banished from hiring. It’s that we must remain vigilant about how and where it wields power. If companies want to use algorithms as assistants, fine. But when those algorithms become the first, last, and sometimes only gatekeeper, we risk turning work into an automated caste system where only those who speak the dialect of the algorithm pass through.

The corporate world loves to speak of innovation, agility, disruption. Yet there is something deeply unimaginative about relying on machines to do the human work of judgment. It suggests a fear of complexity, an aversion to ambiguity, a preference for tidy metrics over messy humanity. But responsibility, the real kind, cannot be measured entirely by pattern-matching. Leadership cannot be identified by sentiment analysis. And trust cannot be bestowed by an algorithm.

We deserve better than being reduced to data points. We deserve to be evaluated by people who understand what it means to be one.


Dantean World #Poem #Painting by Nikos Laios

They descended down
Through the levels,
They walked past
Death and doom,
Eternal torments,

Famine and greed,
Violence and war,
Hunger and despair,
While the privileged few
In London, New York,
Sydney and Milan
Marched with full bellies
And selective rage
Protesting causes
In foreign lands;
While the forgotten poor
Of the world continued
Their descent through
The levels of their
Own Dantean world.

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With a digital painting from Nikos Laios

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Check Nikos Laios' eBOOK, HERE!


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