The impossible balancing act by Sabine Fischer

By all accounts, Europe is tired. Bruised by inflation, burdened with post-pandemic debt, wrestling with ageing populations, and struggling to reform crumbling healthcare systems and underfunded schools, the continent is once again being asked to do something that feels utterly out of tune with its priorities: raise defence spending to 5% of GDP.
It’s not just a number. It’s a political ultimatum wrapped in a camouflage jacket, stitched together in Washington, and waved like a flag by Donald Trump’s allies and military contractors smelling profits like vultures circling a wounded economy.
Let’s not forget not too long ago, Europe was chided for not meeting the 2% NATO spending goal. Now, somehow, in the haze of global insecurity and transatlantic pressure, we’ve leapfrogged straight to 5%, as if military spending were a video game level-up. But this isn’t Call of Duty. This is about billions that could either fortify hospitals and schools or go into armoured personnel carriers and missile defence systems.
Europe’s social contract has always leaned towards the welfare state. Countries like Germany, France, the Netherlands, the Nordics, they don’t just want strong public services. They are part of their democratic identity. Suggest slashing healthcare funding to build tanks and you’ll be met with more than a strike, you’ll spark a philosophical rebellion.
Yet, here comes Trump banging the NATO table again, demanding Europeans pay up or get out. The irony is blinding: an isolationist populist demanding a militarized Europe to defend the same alliance he routinely threatened to leave.
Of course, this is not about European defence per se. It’s about defence industry profits and not necessarily European ones. MAGA isn’t just about coal and cornfields anymore; it’s about Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, smiling their way through Pentagon briefings and defence expos. And if European governments don’t buy American weapons directly, well, maybe they’ll at least raise their spending enough to justify a stronger American presence, funded by European taxpayers.
Let’s talk numbers. France, one of NATO’s top military spenders in Europe, is hovering just above 2% of GDP. The UK, with its global ambitions and post-Brexit military swagger, still struggles to stretch past 2.2%. Germany, after years of pacifist hesitation, is only now catching up slowly.
Now imagine nearly tripling that to 5%. That’s hundreds of billions more across the EU, money that simply doesn’t exist without either brutal austerity or politically suicidal tax hikes.
We’re not talking about cutting back on bureaucratic fluff. We’re talking about choosing between teachers and tanks, insulin and interceptors, kindergartens and cruise missiles.
And for what? To show the White House that Europe is serious about defence? The truth is, no amount of military spending will stop the next American administration from looking inward if it wants to. European deterrence must be built on strategic autonomy, smart alliances, and diplomacy not just dollar signs and defence drills.
There’s a deeper question, too, and it’s one Europe should ask before writing blank checks to arms dealers: What does it mean to defend a country? Is it only tanks, jets, and radar systems? Or does it include a robust healthcare system that doesn’t collapse under the weight of a new pandemic? An education system that prevents radicalization by fostering inclusion and opportunity? Infrastructure that doesn’t crumble with every flood or fire brought on by climate change?
Because if Europe diverts resources away from these vital foundations, it may win a few points at NATO summits but lose the very thing it’s supposedly defending a way of life based on peace, solidarity, and social progress.
This is the trap Europe must avoid: reacting to Trump’s swagger with panic spending, fuelling an American defence industry that cares more about quarterly profits than continental security. If Europe is to invest more in defence, it must be on its own terms coordinated, cooperative, and rooted in long-term strategy, not transatlantic tantrums.
Europe does need stronger defence capabilities. The war in Ukraine made that painfully clear. But this can’t come at the cost of the very societal resilience that makes Europe worth defending. So yes, build the tanks if you must. But don’t bulldoze the textbooks to do it.
Comments