From Hegemony to Harmony: A Roadmap for Bangladesh–India Relations Post-Hasina by Habib Siddiqui

The fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 reset Bangladesh’s domestic politics—and unsettled its most consequential external relationship: India. In the months since, mistrust has deepened, rhetoric has grown inflammatory, and both capitals have taken steps that signal a troubling shift—from what New Delhi once branded as ‘cooperative pragmatism,’ but which most Bangladeshis viewed as a lopsided bargain compromising sovereignty—toward grievance-driven posturing and outright hostility.

The assassination of Osman Hadi—a key figure in the July Revolution(also called Bangladesh’s Second Liberation)—has become a flashpoint, symbolizing the fragility of Bangladesh’s transition and amplifying anti-India sentiment. Ashok Swain, writingforScroll.in, observes that this killing has driven Dhaka–New Delhi relations to their most perilous point in decades. Allegations suggest the perpetrator fled to India, which is also reported to be hosting numerous Awami League leaders, including Sheikh Hasina, who faces convictions linked to the deaths of over 1,400 Bangladeshis.The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of Bangladesh has found crores of Taka in suspicious financial transactions in bank accounts linked to the prime accused Faisal Karim Masud and his associates."The transactions may be linked to money laundering, organized crime and possible terrorist financing," it added.

Recent reporting and commentary note anti-India anger on Bangladeshi streets, tit-for-tat diplomatic démarches, and growing fears that connectivity and trade gains of India of the past decade could stall or unravel if both sides keep “feeding the fire.”

How we got here?

The Scroll analysis makes an important point: Indian political discourse and sections of media have treated Bangladesh’s transition predominantly as a security problem—casting suspicion on the post-Hasina interim order, amplifying anti-Dhaka soundbites, and framing student-led mobilizations as radical threats. That reactive posture, the article argues, is pouring fuel on already volatile sentiment inside Bangladesh.

Compounding the narrative spiral are symbolically charged decisions—particularly the continued presence of Hasina in India after her ouster—that many Bangladeshis read as New Delhi’s political bet on the old order. These optics are not trivial; they shape public opinion and can harden new political elites against engagement. Independent analysts warn that the chill in Dhaka–New Delhi ties is no longer just diplomatic—it’s hitting India’s bottom line. The downturn in Bangladeshi medical tourism, once a billion-dollar lifeline for Indian hospitals, underscores how political missteps are translating into economic pain.

What the July Revolution demanded—and why it matters for external relations

My own and collaborative essaysemphasized that Bangladesh’s youth-led uprising was anchored in accountability, rule of law, and dignity—a rejection of cronyism, politicized institutions, the weaponization of security agencies, and Indian hegemony. We called for a National Accountability Ordinance, an empowered anti-corruption bureau, and swift asset recovery to rebuild trust and deliver tangible economic relief—paired with firm guarantees of minority protection and communal harmony so no actor could hijack the transition with polarizing provocations.

These domestic priorities inevitably shape foreign policy. A government pursuing systemic reform at home needs predictable, non-interfering neighbors abroad. Conversely, a neighbor that signals partiality—whether through sanctuary politics (of providing refuge or safe haven to political figures, dissidents, or fugitives from another country) or securitized commentary (by framing a political or social issue primarily as a security threat)—undercuts moderates in Dhaka, empowers hardliners, and narrows space for pragmatic cooperation.

The escalation loop: incidents and rhetoric

Since Hasina’s fall, Indian media has unleashed relentless attacks on the Interim Government led by Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus. A torrent of fake news and manufactured narratives painted a grim picture of Hindu insecurity in Bangladesh—as if their very survival were at stake. Independent observers, however, found no evidence to support these claims, exposing them as deliberate distortions. This campaign fits a broader pattern of bigotry and intolerance that has come to define India’s political discourse under the current BJP rule.

Even India’s own Bengali-speaking Muslims felt the backlash. Between May and June 2025, Indian authorities forcibly deported and “pushed back” more than 1,500 Bengali-speaking Muslims—including Indian citizens—across the Bangladesh border, fueling humanitarian concerns and diplomatic friction. Inside India, Muslim homes, mosques, and businesses were torched, particularly in Occupied Kashmir and BJP-ruled states such as Uttar Pradesh.

Meanwhile, the fallen dictator Sheikh Hasina was openly hosted in New Delhi, where she accused the Yunus-led government of empowering extremists and destabilizing ties—amplifying political criticism from exile. India provided this platform to foment unrest inside Bangladesh. With funding from pro-Indian and pro-Awami League networks, many operating from Indian soil, anti-government protests and gheraos became an almost daily occurrence in Bangladesh.

Flashpoints now escalate rapidly: an Indian politician calling for reclaiming Chattogram; counter-threats from Dhaka to isolate India’s Northeast; tit-for-tat diplomatic summons; anti-India protests over Osman Hadi’s killing; and sensational coverage of communal violence. Whatever the merits of these claims, the perception of hostile intent is hardening—and that is dangerous.

If this cycle continues, the first Indian casualties will be connectivity projects, border management reforms, and the quiet technical cooperation that has historically cushioned the relationship from political shocks. The deeper risk is a structural reset—from problem-solving to grievance-driven posturing.

Here below I suggest ten practical steps for Dhaka and New Delhi.

1) Mutual non-sanctuary pledge

Issue parallel, public assurances that neither side will shelter politically sensitive fugitives or allow their territories to be used for destabilization. Create a hotline mechanism between interior ministries for case-by-case coordination and rapid clarifications. This directly addresses optics around post-ouster safe haven and related rumors.This step could begin with transparent cooperation on high-profile cases, including a roadmap for addressing individuals facing criminal proceedings, to signal mutual commitment to rule of law.

2) Calibrate media discourse and political speech

Encourage leading outlets and political figures in both countries to adopt de-escalation frames: avoid securitizing student-led activism as extremism and refrain from casting the neighbor as an omnipresent puppet-master. Editors’ roundtables and joint media advisories—facilitated by press councils—can shift incentive structures away from inflammatory sensationalism.

3) Reaffirm minority protection as a shared red line

Reiterate, in Dhaka and New Delhi, that communal violence and temple/church/mosque attacks are intolerable—and set up a bilateral minority safety working group. My August 2024 open letterto the U.S. Congressmen underscored how unverified rumors about temple vandalism can be weaponized; countering that requires transparent, joint fact-checking and rapid public updates.

4) Fast-track accountability reforms to stabilize the street

Advance the National Accountability Ordinance, stand up an independent asset recovery bureau, and publish monthly metrics (assets frozen, funds recovered, cases filed). Economic credibility cools politics; visible progress on accountability undercuts narratives of chaos that foreign media latch onto.

5) Rivers and energy: visible wins within 100 days

Announce near-term deliverables—data-sharing on transboundary rivers, pilot seasonal water releases, and expanded power trade scheduling transparency—to demonstrate cooperation still serves citizens tangibly. Quick wins repair public trust faster than communiqués.

6) Joint protocol on political refugees and high-profile cases

Given the sensitivity around Hasina’s status, Dhaka and New Delhi should codify case-handling protocols: humanitarian protections, non-political use of asylum, and clear boundaries against public mobilization. Transparent rules lower the temperature and reduce space for rumour-mongering.

7) Border public-safety charter

Launch a Border Human Security Initiative—joint training to reduce lethal incidents, community liaison boards, and shared incident dashboards. Media-reported flashpoints often originate near borders; human-centric protocols can turn borders from theatres of fear into corridors of normalcy.

8) Youth and university exchanges as political shock absorbers

Scale up student exchange programs, hackathons on river health and logistics, and joint scholarships. The July Revolution was youth-led; giving that cohort constructive cross-border channels reduces susceptibility to hostile narratives and builds constituencies for moderation.

9) A “no surprises” compact among diplomats

Agree that ambassadors and high commissioners will provide advance private notice of sensitive actions (summons, advisories, major public statements). “No surprises” habits prevent symbolic slights from escalating into public showdowns.

10) A State-level Apology from India

For decades, India has acted less like a partner and more like a hegemon—interfering in Bangladesh’s internal politics and prioritizing its own strategic interests at Bangladesh’s expense. This pattern must end. Nothing would signal a genuine reset better than an open acknowledgment of past wrongs. A formal apology to the people and government of Bangladesh would go a long way toward healing deep-seated mistrust.

Yes, this may be the hardest step for India to take—but it is essential for its own long-term stability and regional credibility. During the Hasina era, India enjoyed unprecedented, one-sided gains under the banner of “connectivity.” By leveraging overland routes through Bangladesh, India’s landlocked Northeast—the “Seven Sisters”—secured vital access to the sea, strengthening regional integration and maritime strategy.

India reaped enormous benefits: new cross-border passenger trains like the Mitali, Bandhan, and Maitree Express boosted trade and tourism; the Akhaura–Agartala rail link, Maitri Setu bridge, improved inland waterways, and expanded port access at Chattogram and Mongla enabled faster, cheaper movement of goods—critical for the Northeast, West Bengal, and Bihar. Access to Bangladeshi seaports diversified India’s logistics, cut costs, and supported exports. These projects didn’t just accelerate trade—they fortified India’s geopolitical posture, turning connectivity into a strategic asset.

Acknowledging past interference and offering a formal apology would not diminish India—it would elevate its moral authority and reset the relationship on a foundation of mutual respect.

Why this approach is realistic now

Independent strategic notes this year describe a drift from the previous decade’s problem-solving ethos toward mutual suspicion. Reversing that drift does not require grand bargains; it requires small, confidence-building moves that insulate technical cooperation from the political cycle while Bangladesh consolidates reforms at home. That, in turn, strengthens Dhaka’s hand with its own public—because citizens can see practical benefits—and gives New Delhi pragmatic partners rather than polarized counterparts.

Just as the July Revolution was ultimately a demand for dignity and accountability, a stable post-Hasina foreign policy rests on predictability and restraint—from both sides. The fastest way to cool tension is to change incentives: punish grandstanding, reward quiet fixes, and measure progress transparently.


Dr. Habib Siddiqui is a peace and human rights advocate with a distinguished career in operational excellence. He has successfully led Lean transformation initiatives across four major multinational corporations. His forthcoming book, Operational Excellence in the Process Industry: A Practitioner’s Guide to Lean Six Sigma, offers practical insights for driving efficiency and innovation in complex industrial environments.


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From Hegemony to Harmony: A Roadmap for Bangladesh–India Relations Post-Hasina by Habib Siddiqui

The fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 reset Bangladesh’s domestic politics—and unsettled its most consequential external relationship: I...