It is one thing for Washington to promote its industries abroad but it is quite another to scold its allies for attempting to stand on their own feet. Yet that is precisely the posture the Pentagon has reportedly adopted in response to the European Union’s renewed push to “buy European” when it comes to defence procurement. The message from Washington sharpened under Secretary of ...War, Pete Hegseth and aligned with the political instincts of Donald Trump is unmistakable; Europe is free to spend more on defence so long as it spends that money in America.
This is not alliance management; it is mercantilism draped in a flag. For years, American officials have hectored European capitals about defence spending. NATO’s two-per-cent benchmark became both mantra and cudgel during the Trump years. Europeans were told they were freeloaders, complacent tenants in a security architecture financed by U.S. taxpayers. Fine. Europe has absorbed the criticism. Russia’s war in Ukraine jolted the continent into action. Budgets have risen. Factories are reopening. Joint procurement schemes are being designed to ensure interoperability and scale.
And now, when Brussels attempts to cultivate its own defence-industrial base, to reduce fragmentation, to build ammunition plants, to invest in next-generation systems, Washington signals retaliation if American firms are “strong-armed” out of contracts. The subtext is as clear as it is contradictory; spend more, but not like that.
This tension exposes a deeper American anxiety. For decades Europe’s military dependence has been a feature, not a bug, of the transatlantic relationship. It ensured influence. It guaranteed markets. It cemented a hierarchy. American defence giants thrived on European orders and European governments, in turn, accepted a degree of strategic dependency as the price of the American security umbrella.
But dependency is a fragile glue for alliances. It breeds resentment on one side and entitlement on the other. When European policymakers argue that relying excessively on U.S. systems, fighter jets, missile defences, drones, creates political vulnerability, they are not indulging in anti-American theatrics. They are responding to reality. The same political movement that demanded Europe “pay up” now warns of punishment if Europe diversifies its suppliers. That is not strategic coherence; it is strategic mood swing.
The irony is that a more capable European defence sector would strengthen, not weaken, the Atlantic partnership. A Europe able to produce more of its own munitions, armored vehicles, and air defences would shoulder a greater share of the burden in Ukraine and beyond. It would reduce pressure on American stockpiles. It would provide redundancy in a world where supply chains are brittle and geopolitics unforgiving.
Yet the current American rhetoric frames European industrial ambition as betrayal. The logic appears transactional; alliance solidarity is measured in purchase orders. “Make America Great Again” becomes less a slogan than a procurement directive.
This approach risks accelerating precisely what Washington fears. If European leaders conclude that American security guarantees are contingent on commercial loyalty, they will redouble efforts to insulate themselves. Strategic autonomy, once a French hobbyhorse, will become a continental consensus. Defence integration inside the EU will be pursued not as an abstract aspiration but as insurance against political volatility in Washington.
There is also a moral dimension. The United States has long championed free markets and competition. To threaten retaliation because European governments choose European suppliers is to abandon that rhetoric when it proves inconvenient. It suggests that “free trade” applies only when American firms win.
Allies are not subsidiaries. They are partners. Partnerships require respect for each side’s domestic politics and strategic calculations. Europe’s desire to rebuild its defence industry is not anti-American; it is pro-European. If Washington cannot distinguish between the two, it risks converting irritation into estrangement.
Great powers secure loyalty not by coercing customers but by cultivating trust. If the Pentagon insists on treating Europe’s rearmament as a zero-sum contest for market share, it may discover that the most enduring retaliation is not tariffs or procurement rules but the quiet, steady erosion of confidence across the Atlantic.
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