Serge Schmemann’s recent New York Times essay (The Old World Order Is Over. This Is What Could Come Next, dated October 18, 2026) offers a sweeping but speculative analysis on America’s global role in the aftermath of the Trump era. He sketches three possible futures for the United States and the world. It is an ambitious piece, drawing on conversations with foreign-policy thinkers and invoking historical analogies to frame the stakes of the present moment. Yet for all its breadth, the article suffers from conceptual imprecision, selective historical memory, and an overreliance on familiar liberal narratives that obscure more than they illuminate. A critical reading reveals an argument that is rhetorically compelling but analytically uneven, and one that ultimately underestimates the structural forces reshaping global politics.
A Framing Built on Nostalgia
Schmemann begins with a stark assertion: America has changed, and Donald Trump is the face of that change. He describes Trump as a president who “demeaned allies and courted autocrats,” and who sought to accumulate powers beyond constitutional limits. This framing is not inaccurate — Trump’s tenure has been marked by norm-breaking and institutional strain — but Schmemann treats Trump as both symptom and cause without clearly distinguishing the two. The article implies that Trump’s rise represents a deviation from an otherwise stable liberal democratic trajectory. Yet the political, economic, and cultural conditions that enabled Trump — polarization, inequality, institutional decay, and distrust of elites — long predate him.
By anchoring his narrative in Trump’s personality, Schmemann inadvertently narrows the scope of his analysis. The question is not whether America can “return” to its role as a global beacon of democracy once Trump is gone. The deeper question is whether the post-1945 liberal order was ever as stable, inclusive, or universally admired as Schmemann suggests. His essay assumes a golden age of American leadership that can be restored through renewed commitment to democratic values. But this assumption glosses over decades of contested U.S. foreign policy — from Vietnam to Iraq, from covert interventions to support for authoritarian allies, and most deplorably, Washington’s unwavering backing of Israel even as leading human‑rights organizations and international legal bodies have accused it of committing atrocities amounting to genocide in Gaza — all of which complicate the notion of America as a consistently principled global actor.
I. The Problematic Ideal of the “Shining City on a Hill”
In the “America Makes a Comeback” scenario, Schmemann imagines a future in which a law-abiding, globally minded president restores America’s moral authority. Europe welcomes the United States back as a trusted ally, Russia stabilizes after Putin’s departure, China surpasses the U.S. economically but cooperates peacefully, and the United Nations is revitalized. This is the most optimistic of his three visions, and it reads like a liberal internationalist wish list.
The problem is not the aspiration but the plausibility. Schmemann’s scenario assumes that American leadership is both necessary and sufficient for global stability. Yet the world he describes — multipolar, technologically disruptive, economically fragmented — cannot be governed by a single hegemon, even a benevolent one. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, the assertiveness of middle powers, and the erosion of Western dominance are structural shifts, not temporary deviations. They cannot be reversed simply by electing a more conventional American president.
Moreover, Schmemann’s invocation of America’s “new birth of freedom” echoes Abraham Lincoln but overlooks the uneven and contested nature of American progress. The expansion of rights has always been driven by social movements, not by presidential leadership alone. To suggest that America can reclaim its global moral authority through executive virtue is to misunderstand the sources of democratic renewal.
II. The Muddling Middle: A More Realistic but Underdeveloped Scenario
Schmemann’s second scenario, “We Muddle Along,” is arguably the most realistic. It envisions a world in which the United States remains powerful but no longer admired, China grows more assertive, alliances weaken, and global governance stagnates. This is not a dramatic collapse but a slow erosion of influence.
Yet even here, Schmemann’s analysis is incomplete. He attributes America’s diminished standing primarily to domestic polarization and inconsistent foreign policy. While these factors matter, they are not the whole story. The decline of U.S. influence is also driven by:
- Economic shifts: The diffusion of manufacturing, the rise of Asian markets, and the limits of dollar dominance.
- Technological disruption: The emergence of digital ecosystems not controlled by Western institutions.
- Demographic changes: Aging populations in the West and youthful, dynamic societies elsewhere.
- Ideological pluralism: The spread of governance models that challenge liberal democracy’s universality.
- Parallel multilateralism — The proliferation of non‑Western institutions such as BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which increasingly coordinate global norms and economic frameworks without U.S. participation.
- Resource bottlenecks — Growing vulnerability in critical mineral supply chains, coupled with domestic fiscal constraints and mounting debt, which limit America’s ability to project power or sustain long‑term strategic commitments.
- Alliance hedging — Traditional allies pursuing strategic autonomy, from Europe’s defense integration to Gulf states’ multi‑alignment strategies, leaving the United States facing multi‑theater over‑extension without guaranteed coalition support.
- Asymmetric deterrence — The rapid proliferation of cyber capabilities, gray‑zone tactics, and low‑cost anti‑access/area‑denial (A2/AD) technologies that erode U.S. military dominance and empower smaller states and non‑state actors to challenge American influence at minimal cost.
Schmemann acknowledges some of these trends but treats them as background conditions rather than central drivers. His muddling scenario is persuasive, but it lacks analytical depth.
III. The Decline Scenario: A Familiar Dystopia
The third scenario, “Unchecked Decline,” is the darkest. Here, polarization paralyzes the United States, alliances collapse, China annexes Taiwan, AI runs amok, climate change wreaks havoc, and regional conflicts proliferate. This is a classic dystopian projection, and Schmemann uses it to warn against complacency.
Yet the scenario suffers from two weaknesses. First, it relies heavily on worst-case assumptions without explaining how they interact. For example, China’s annexation of Taiwan is presented as both a sign of American weakness and a trigger for global instability, but the geopolitical dynamics behind such an event are left unexplored. Second, Schmemann’s depiction of AI as a source of “rogue incursions and raids” feels more like science fiction than grounded analysis. The real risks of AI — algorithmic bias, surveillance, labor displacement — are serious but more mundane.
The decline scenario is rhetorically effective but analytically thin, relying on fear rather than structural reasoning.
IV. A Missing Fourth Scenario: A Post-American World
The most striking omission in Schmemann’s essay is the absence of a scenario in which the world adapts to a reduced American role without descending into chaos. He presents only three options: American restoration, muddling stagnation, or catastrophic decline. What he does not consider is a world in which regional powers, multilateral institutions, and transnational networks evolve new forms of governance that do not depend on U.S. leadership.
Such a scenario is not only plausible but already emerging. The European Union is developing autonomous defense capabilities. India and Brazil are asserting independent foreign policies. African nations are forming new regional blocs. Southeast Asia is navigating U.S.–China competition with strategic flexibility. These developments suggest a future in which global order is not defined by American primacy but by distributed leadership.
Schmemann’s failure to consider this possibility reflects a deeper bias: the assumption that America’s centrality is both inevitable and indispensable. This is not analysis; it is nostalgia.
Conclusion: A Thoughtful but Limited Vision
Serge Schmemann’s article is thoughtful, elegantly written, and grounded in genuine concern for the future of democracy. But its analytical framework is constrained by a longing for a liberal order that no longer exists. The world is not waiting for America to return to its former role. It is already moving on, reshaping itself through new alignments, new technologies, and new centers of power.
A more rigorous analysis would acknowledge that America’s future will be determined not only by its domestic politics but by structural global transformations that cannot be reversed by leadership alone. Schmemann’s scenarios are useful as provocations, but they fall short as predictions. The challenge is not to restore an old order but to understand — and shape — the new one.
Dr. Siddiqui is a peace and human rights activist who is author of several books including: Democracy, Politics and Terrorism - America's Quest for Security in the Age of Insecurity(2008)
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