
Europe has spent decades confusing an American security guarantee with a European security strategy. Now that Washington's political mood has become increasingly unpredictable, the confusion is turning into a strategic nightmare.
The conversations surrounding the European Political Community and the informal gathering of European leaders in Dublin expose a problem that Brussels has preferred to decorate with diplomatic language rather than confront. The transatlantic relationship is changing, the war in Ukraine continues to expose Europe's vulnerabilities, and the American commitment to European security can no longer be treated as an unquestionable constant. Yet European leaders continue to behave as though the next American administration, the next presidential announcement or the next political tantrum from Washington will somehow restore the old comfortable arrangement. It will not. And perhaps it is time somebody in Europe said so without diplomatic lipstick.
For generations, European security has rested on an extraordinary political convenience. Washington supplied the strategic muscle, NATO supplied the institutional framework, and European governments supplied the speeches about unity, democracy and shared values. It was an arrangement that allowed European capitals to enjoy the economic dividends of peace while postponing the expensive and politically inconvenient business of building genuine strategic independence. The bill has finally arrived.
Ukraine has demonstrated, in the most brutal possible terms, that European security is not an abstract discussion about defence percentages, summit communiqués or ceremonial handshakes. It is about ammunition production, intelligence capabilities, military logistics, air defence, industrial capacity, energy resilience and the political determination to sustain a commitment when the cameras have moved elsewhere. Europe has discovered that announcing solidarity is considerably easier than manufacturing artillery shells.
The problem is not NATO itself. NATO remains indispensable, and the American contribution to European defence cannot simply be replaced overnight. The problem is Europe's dangerous dependence on the assumption that American interests will always coincide with European interests. They may frequently overlap, but they are not identical. Washington has its own electoral calculations, domestic political battles, global priorities and increasingly transactional understanding of international relationships. Europe cannot continue pretending otherwise.
The European Political Community should therefore become more than another diplomatic theatre where leaders gather, exchange reassuring phrases and return home convinced that cooperation has somehow advanced. It should provide a serious political framework for coordinating security across the continent, including countries outside the European Union, particularly those whose geographical position places them directly in the path of Russian aggression and regional instability. But coordination without capability is simply another European hobby.
The European Union needs a credible common defence-industrial strategy, integrated procurement, stronger intelligence cooperation, coordinated protection of critical infrastructure and the ability to sustain military assistance without waiting for Washington's permission or political approval. It must also confront the uncomfortable question of whether its existing decision-making structures can respond quickly enough when security emergencies develop.
Furthermore, strategic autonomy must not become an excuse for nationalist militarisation or another competition between European governments eager to display their military importance. A continent divided by competing defence industries, duplicated procurement programmes and political vanity will remain strategically weak, regardless of how many billions it spends.
And there is another uncomfortable truth: Europe must stop treating Ukraine as a peripheral security problem that can be managed through successive emergency packages. Ukraine's survival, sovereignty and future security are inseparable from the security architecture of the entire continent.
The Dublin discussions should therefore be remembered not for what European leaders said about Washington, but for what they were finally forced to recognise about themselves. Europe has money, institutions, technological expertise and democratic legitimacy. What it has repeatedly lacked is the political courage to turn those advantages into strategic power.
The American security umbrella was never supposed to become a European permanent residence. The transatlantic alliance should remain a partnership between capable allies, not a relationship between a continent waiting for protection and a superpower deciding whether protection remains politically convenient.
Europe must grow up strategically. Not tomorrow, not after another American election, and certainly not after another Russian provocation. The next European security crisis will not wait for an invitation to an informal summit in Dublin. And history is unlikely to accept another beautifully worded declaration as an adequate substitute for responsibility.
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